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JURISDICTION BEYOND 200 MILES:
A PERSISTENT PROBLEM
For the past six years1 the Third United Nations Law of the
Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) has attempted to resolve the issue
of how far coastal state jurisdiction should extend over the conti-
nental shelf.2 Ranging in width from two to more than 600 miles,3
the continental shelf contains nearly one-third of the world's petro-
leum resources.' In size, it is equivalent to eighteen percent of the
earth's land surfaces,' and estimates indicate that it contains 2,500
billion barrels of oil. 6 Considering the shelf's enormous potential
wealth, it is not surprising that its control is an issue of great contro-
versy and concern to many nations.
While no definitive means of determining the outer boundary
of the shelf has yet emerged from the Conference, there appears to
be widespread acceptance of a 200-mile jurisdictional zone known
as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).7 Endorsed by nearly sev-
enty-three percent of the conferees at the 1974 meetings,8 the 200-
mile EEZ places the resources of 35.4% of the world's ocean (and
ocean floor) under national control.9 What the conferees have been
unable to agree upon is the status of the continental shelf beyond
the 200-mile limit.
For the most part, those coastal nations with wide continental
shelves have adhered to their belief that jurisdiction extends be-
1. The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference held its first substantive
meetings in 1974.
2. The term continental shelf has many legal and geological definitions. Two such
definitions are:
A generally shallow, flat submerged portion of a continent, extending to a point of
steep descent to the ocean floor. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 288 (1973).
A zone adjacent to a continent or around an island, and extending from the low
water line to a depth at which there is usually a marked increase of slope to a
greater depth. Oxman, The Preparation of Article I of the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf, 3 J. MARITIME L. 252 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Oxman].
3. Swing, Who Will Own The Oceans, 54 FOR. AFF. 529 (1976).
4. Howe, Petroleum Operations in the Sea- 1980 and Beyond(1968), reprinted in G.A.
DOVMANI, OCEAN WEALTH, POLICY AND POTENTIAL, at 26 (1973).
5. Emery, The Continental Shelves, ScI. AM., Sept. 1969, at 108.
6. Swing, supra note 3, at 535.
7. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the
Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569, 570 (1975).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 573.
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yond the EEZ to the outer limit of the continental margin.' 0 They
claim that existing international law supports this position," and
have indicated an unwillingness to accept any treaty that dimin-
ishes their present rights. 12 Not surprisingly, this interpretation of
existing international law is rejected by the majority of states with
narrow shelves. These nations seek to limit jurisdictional control to
200 miles,' 3 leaving resources from the area beyond 200 miles for
the "common heritage of mankind."' 4
This Comment reviews the development of the continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone doctrines. It then examines the
provisions of the UNCLOS III Draft Treaty which relate to the
seaward extension of the continental shelf and discusses the rela-
tionship between the continental shelf and the EEZ. Finally, this
Comment examines and analyzes some possible compromise solu-
tions concerning the status of the continental shelf beyond 200
miles, and attempts to determine what laws may govern interna-
tional practice should UNCLOS III fail to produce an acceptable
treaty.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINENTAL SHELF LAW
A. Early History
The origin of continental shelf law is commonly attributed to
the Truman Proclamation. 5 Issued in 1945, the Truman Procla-
mation represents the first nationalistic assertion of a jurisdictional
claim over the resources "of the subsoil and seabed of the continen-
tal shelf."' 6 Prior to the Proclamation, jurisdictional claims beyond
10. The continental margin is the zone separating the emergent continents from the
deep sea bottoms; it generally consists of the continental shelf, slope and rise. Oxman, supra
note 2.
11. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 28, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. REP. 3 (1969), reprinledin
8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 340 (1969).
12. See text accompanying notes 118-121 infra.
13. See text accompanying note 78 infra.
14. The Common Heritage of Mankind provides that the resources of the ocean floor
beyond national jurisdiction are to be used for the betterment of mankind as a whole. Decla-
ration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Be-
yond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24,
U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor].
15. Policy of the United States with Respect to the National Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, reprinted in 59
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the narrow limits of the three mile territorial sea were quite rare. '7
By declaring that it had exclusive rights to the resources of the con-
tinental shelf seaward to the point where the water exceeded 200
meters in depth, 18 the United States initiated what became, in ef-
fect, an oceanic "land grab" and a new area in the law of the sea.' 9
This new area - continental shelf law - developed quickly. Uni-
lateral declarations by other nations laying claims to the continen-
tal shelf off their coasts quickly followed. Mexico,20 Panama,21
Argentina,22 and Peru23 issued such declarations, and Costa Rica
incorporated a claim into their constitution.24 During the 1950's
additional nations made continental shelf claims, but unfortu-
nately, these declarations were often ambiguous and did not con-
tain any uniform language. Some claims extended over the
continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters,25 some made no depth
reference at all,26 others claimed the continental or insular
shelves, 27 and still others claimed the epicontinenta 28 sea as well as
the continental shelf.29 The result of these varying and undefined
claims was confusion. It became increasingly difficult to declare
with certainty just how much of the earth's continental shelf was
controlled by which nation. In light of the vast hydrocarbon re-
sources that were contained within the shelf and the pressures for
their development, a clear definition and delineation became im-
perative.
One of the early attempts at creating a uniform definition of
the continental shelf occurred in 1956 at the Inter-American Spe-
17. Norway and Sweden have maintained a four-mile limit for many years. Russia has
maintained a 12-mile limit since 1912. S. SWARTRAUBER, THE THREE MILE Limirr OF TER-
RITORIAL SEAs (1972); Gutteridge, Beyond The Three Mile Limit: Recent Developments Af-
fecting the Law ofthe Sea, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 195, 198 (1974); Kent, Hitorical Origins of the
Three Mile Limit, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954).
18. Truman Proclamation, supra note 15.
19. Martens, Evolution of Coastal State Jurisdiction". A Confict Between Developed and
Developing Nations, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533 (1973).
20. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/I at 13-14 (1951).
21. Id. at 15-16.
22. Id. at 4-5.
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. Costa Rica Decree L. 116, July 27, 1948. EL SALVADOR CONST. of 1950 art. 7 [here-
inafter cited as Costa Rica Decree].
25. Truman Proclamation, supra note 15.
26. Mexico, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27. Costa Rica Decree, supra note 24.
28. Argentina, supra note 22 and accompanying text. Argentina never provided a defi-
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cialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources at
Ciudad Trujillo.3" There, the twenty attending nations created a
definition which introduced an additional new term - the conti-
nental and insular terrace.3' Although this term was dropped from
later definitions, the Conference's definition remains noteworthy
for its introduction of yet another measuring device -
exploitability.32 In their final resolution the conferees unanimously
adopted the following:
The sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and
insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal
state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the super-
adjacent waters admits to the exploitation of the natural resources
of the sea-bed and subsoil, appertain exclusively to that state and
are subject to its jurisdiction and control.
33
In preparation for the First United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference (UNCLOS I) the International Law Commission (ILC)
included in its draft articles the exploitability criterion advanced at
Ciudad Trujillo.34 In justifying its inclusion, the ILC stated that
the exploitability provision was necessary since "technical develop-
ments in the near future might make it possible to exploit the re-
sources of the seabed at a depth of over 200 meters."35 In order to
avoid "the disadvantage of instability which 200 meters might cre-
ate," the ILC decided not to specify a depth limit.36
In 1958, representatives of eighty-six nations met at Geneva
for UNCLOS I. Before the Conference ended they had agreed
upon a definition of the continental shelf:
For the purposes of these articles, the term 'continental shelf' is
used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of
30. Inter-American Specialized Conference on "Conservation of Natural Resources:
The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters," Ciudad Trujillo (now Santo Domingo) Domini-
can Republic, March 15-28, 1956, Final Act, Diario at 32-35 (Pan American Union 1956)
[hereinafter cited as Ciudad Trujillo Conf.].
3 1. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
32. Id.
33. Ciudad Trujillo Conf., Final Act, supra note 30, at 13. Oxman, supra note 2 at 450-
51 (emphasis added).
34. I.L.C. Report 8th Sess., 11956] at 41-42, Article 67. Oxman, supra note 2, at 468.
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the natural resources of the said areas: (b) to the seabed and
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of is-
lands.
37
By adopting the exploitability provision developed at the
Ciudad Trujillo Conference, the Geneva conferees incorporated
several different measuring devices into the Convention. Instead of
the much needed definitive limit, the Conference had chosen a defi-
nition based upon three criteria: exploitability, adjacency, and
water depth, 8 none of which were subject to precise delimitation.
By failing to provide a single definitive test by which to determine
the extent of coastal state jurisdiction, the Convention left the indi-
vidual nations free to pursue self-serving unilateral action.
First Ghana39 claimed a 100-mile fishery conservation zone,
then Guinea' claimed a 130-mile territorial sea. Argentina4' and
Nicaragua4 2 followed with 200-mile claims, while Pakistan4 3 and
Cameroon' also extended their jurisdiction. By 1967, sixteen na-
tions had jurisdictional claims in excess of twelve miles.45
B. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
As additional nations joined in the grab for oceanic territory, a
dispute developed in the North Sea over control of the continental
shelf. In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,' (North Sea
Cases) the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was asked to estab-
lish criteria for the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries be-
tween adjoining. states. By declaring that states have an "inherent
right"47 to that area of the "continental shelf that constitutes a natu-
ral prolongation of its land territory,"48 the Court created yet an-
other method for measuring seaward jurisdictional limits. By
37. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 1I, art. 1.
38. Id.
39. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, at 23 (1976).
40. Id. at 24.
41. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15, at 45 (1970).
42. Delimiting the National Fishing Zone to 200 Nautical Miles, Decree No. II of April
5, 1965, arts. 1-2, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15, at 656 (1970):
43. President's Proclamation of Feb. 19, 1966, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.
B/18, at 344 (1976). Pakistan claimed a 100-mile fishery zone.
44. Ordinance GPJFT/25, Nov. 13, 1967, reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15,
at 51 (1970).
45. Lynch, The Nepal Proposalfor a Common Heritage Fund- Panacea or Pipedream?,
10 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 25, 30 (1980).
46. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 11.
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introducing the term "natural prolongation," the Court seemed to
be saying that the coastal state maintained jurisdiction over that
area of seabed between the shoreline and the abyssal ocean floor -
an area encompassing not only the continental shelf, but the conti-
nental slope and rise as well.4 9 When the Court's natural prolonga-
tion concept is coupled with the existing definitions from the 1958
Convention, it becomes abundantly clear that the Court's decision
represents a step backward. Instead of clarifying the definitional
dispute, the Court further complicated the matter by introducing
another measurement criterion. As one author stated, "The North
Sea Case illustrates. . . the urgent necessity of: (a) a definite verti-
cal or horizontal limitation of the continental shelf, instead of the
open-ended 'grab' situation permitted by Article 1 of the Conven-
tion."50
Thus, by 1970, several conflicting criteria existed for determin-
ing the seaward extent of the continental shelf. There was the 200-
meter provision, the adjacency test,52 the exploitability test,53 and
the concept of natural prolongation.54 The lack of clarity provided
by these terms was further compounded by the fact that numerous
conflicting legal and geological definitions existed for the continen-
tal shelf.55
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
A. Early History of 200-Mile Claims
Shortly after the issuance of the Truman Proclamation the first
200-mile jurisdictional claims emerged. Initially asserted by
Chile 5 6 in 1947, the 200-mile zone did not receive the same immedi-
ate widespread acceptance that the continental shelf had enjoyed.
49. There is not uniform acceptance of this explanation of the term natural prolonga-
tion. See Finlay, The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 52-57
(1970); Henkin, International Law and "the Interests" The Law of the Seabed, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 504 (1969); Henkin, A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1970).
50. Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases -A Critique, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
229, 240 (1970).
51. Convention of the Continental Shelf, supra note 11, art. 1.
52. Id.; see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 11, para. 41.
53. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 11, art. 1.
54. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 11, para. 19.
55. Hedberg, Relation of Political Boundaries on the Ocean Floor to the Continental Mar-
gin, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 57, 74-75 app. (1976).
56. Supra note 20, at 16-17 (1951).
6
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Although Chile was soon joined by Ecuador57 and Peru,58 the 200-
mile zone remained somewhat of an oddity. Viewed by some as
either extravagant or unlawful, these claims met with strong pro-
tests.59
Despite opposition, the three nations jointly issued the Decla-
ration of Santiago6" in 1952, proclaiming that each country pos-
sessed "sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of the sea
adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not less than
200 nautical miles."'" By the 1958 Geneva Conference, only four
countries - Costa Rica,62 Honduras,63 Panama,' and El Salva-
dor 65 - had joined the 200-mile group. Maintaining that "there
[was] no juridicial or logical basis for a 12-mile limit," 66 these coun-
tries took advantage of the failure of UNCLOS I and II to reach an
agreement concerning the width of the territorial sea. This failure
to define the limits of the territorial sea left these and other nations,
at least in their judgment, free to define their own jurisdictional
limits. As a result, by 1970 many other nations had extended their
boundaries.67
Although not all of these extensions were for 200 miles, 68 there
was a general realization that some sort of international agreement
was necessary before any jurisdictional conflicts developed. It was
57. Decree No. 003, Feb. 22, 1951, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/l/Add I (1952); 4 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 799-800 (1965).
58. Presidential Decree No. 781 of Aug. 1, 1947, U.N. Doc ST/LEG/SER. B/I, at 16
(1951); 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 797-98 (1965).
59. Kunz, Continental Shelf and International Law- Confusion and Abuse, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 828, 835-36 (1956). As one author commented: "The overwhelming majority of
states are opposed to a 200-mile limit."
60. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/6, at 723 (1957).
61. Id. at 723-24.
62. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 36 NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION,
at 21 (2nd rev. ed. 1974).
63. Id. at 47.
64. Supra note 20, at 15-16 (1951).
65. Supra note 62, at 30.
66. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SR. 80, at 3 (1972).
67. Ten nations made 200-mile claims by 1970. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Honduras withdrew its
claim during this time. For a complete list ofjurisdictional claims, see U.N. Food and Agri-
culture Organization Fisheries, LIMITS AND STATUS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, EXCLUSIVE
FISHING ZONES, FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONES AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, Circular
No. 127 (Rome, Aug. 1971), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1255 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as FAO Study].
68. For example, Ghana claimed a 100-mile fishery zone. Guinea claimed a 130-mile
territorial sea and the Maldives claimed an area of up to 55 miles. For a complete list of
claims, see FAO Study, supra note 67.
Vol. 10
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against this background that the United Nations voted to convene
UNCLOS 111.69
B. UNCLOS III Preparation
Passed in 1970, the resolution convening UNCLOS III called
for three years of preparatory work to be done by the United Na-
tions Seabeds Committee, with the actual conference beginning in
1973. During the preparatory stages of UNCLOS III a number of
regional declarations on the 200-mile zone were issued. 70 Incorpo-
rating the term "exclusive economic zone," these declarations gave
the coastal state control of all resources to a distance of 200 miles,
regardless of the breadth of their continental shelf. The first of
these regional declarations was the Declaration of Montevideo. 7'
Issued by nine Latin American states in 1970, the Declaration en-
dorsed the 200-mile zone concept. This Declaration was followed
by the Declaration of Santo Domingo,72 where nine additional
states, none of which had 200-mile zones, supported the idea. Simi-
lar declarations were issued at Yaounde7 and Addis Abbaba,74
where the forty-one members of the Organization of African States
endorsed the idea. It was therefore not surprising that the 200-mile




The first substantive meeting of UNCLOS III commenced in
Caracas, in 1974, with more than 140 nations represented.76 The
69. G.A. RES. 2750, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 224
(1971).
70. Infra notes 71-74.
71. Montevideo Declaration on Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/34
(1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1081 (1970).
72. Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 7, 1972, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), 70
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/80 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 892 (1972).
73. Yaounde Conclusions of the Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, 27 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), 74, June 20-30, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/79 (1972), reprinted in
12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 210 (1973).
74. Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Addis Abbaba Declaration of
Issues of the Law of the Sea, May 24, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/89 (1973), reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1200 (1973).
75. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) A/8721 72,
U.N. Doc. A/AC, 138/79 (1972); 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 30, U.N. Doc. 9021
(1973).
76. For a complete list of all attending nations, see 11974] U.N.Y.B., at 71-72.
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Conference assigned the work relating to both the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf to Committee Two.77 At the
initial Committee meetings on the EEZ the overwhelming majority
of nations endorsed the principle of a 200-mile.zone. 78 The follow-
ing year, UNCLOS III produced a draft treaty, the Informal Single
Negotiating Text (ISNT).79 Although the treaty did not necessarily
reflect the majority view on each issue, it provided the delegates a
base from which to work.
Under the initial version of the ISNT, each coastal state was
entitled to a 200-mile EEZ.8° Within that zone the coastal state
would exercise "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or non-living, of the seabed and subsoil. ' ' 8' In addition,
those nations whose continental margins 2 extended beyond the
200-mile limit would be entitled to exercise jurisdiction throughout
the natural prolongation of their land territory to the outer edge of
the continental margin, subject only to limited international re-
straints.83 However, the ISNT failed to provide a definition of the
continental margin, thereby rendering precise delimitation impossi-
ble, since numerous definitions of the continental margin exist.
From the meetings there emerged two divergent schools of
thought regarding the relationship between the continental shelf
and the exclusive economic zone. One group of nations, mostly
those with exceptionally wide continental margins,8 4 voiced their
objection to any attempt at limiting jurisdiction to 200 miles. They
contended that under existing international law the entire continen-
tal margin was subject to their exclusive sovereign rights.8 5 They
77. Id. at 74.
78. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR 21-28 (1974).
79. Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.1 (1975).
Later versions of the text are titled INFORMAL COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT (ICNT).
80. Id. art. 46. This article was renumbered Article 57 in later draft treaties.
81. Id. art. 45. This article was renumbered Article 56 in later draft treaties.
82. Id. art. 62. The initial draft treaty did not provide any definition of the term conti-
nental margin. A definition was adopted in 1978. For definitions of the continental margin,
see notes 10 supra and 126 infra. See also supra note 55.
83. Id. art. 69, Another portion of the ISNT provided for revenue sharing of an unde-
termined amount of those resources taken from the continental margin beyond the 200-mile
limit.
84. Those nations with wide margins include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, In-
dia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet
Union. See appendix I for map.
85. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
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cited both the 1958 Convention and the North Sea Cases as support
for their reasoning.
Many of the developing nations opposed this line of reasoning.
They firmly believed that a flat 200-mile zone should be the defini-
tive limit for all nations.8 6 In viewing the EEZ as the answer to the
continental shelf problem, they reasoned that the shelf would be
subsumed within the EEZ, thereby eliminating any need to clearly
define it. 7 As to portions of the continental margin situated be-
yond the 200-mile limit, they maintained that to allow its national-
istic control would seriously undermine the principle of the
common heritage of mankind.
88
A. Supportfor Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles
Predictably, many of the nations with the most to gain by an
extension of jurisdiction beyond 200 miles found the ISNT provi-
sions acceptable.
By providing for jurisdiction "throughout the natural prolon-
gation. . . . to the outer edge of the continental margin," the draft
treaty supported and sanctioned their jurisdictional claims beyond
200 miles. They regarded this provision as consistent with both the
1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf and the 1969 North Sea
Cases. They reasoned that the exploitability provision of the 1958
Convention allowed jurisdiction throughout the entire shelf area,
regardless of the distance from the coastline, and that the North Sea
Cases sanctioned jurisdiction throughout the natural prolongation
of the land territory.
Australia, whose continental margin extends beyond the 200-
mile limit, maintained that the laws presently in force must not be
adversely affected:
The coastal state should exercise sovereign rights over the conti-
nental shelf up to the external limit of the continental margin
• . . [A]ny diminution of the rights of the coastal state over the
continental shelf would be inequitable .... [T]here was no
reason . . . . why a coastal state should be deprived of an area
over which it had existing rights.8 9
Another state whose continental shelf extends significantly be-
yond the 200-mile limit is Argentina. At the conference, Argentina
86. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 22-27 (1974).
87, Id.
88. See text accompanying notes 111-121 infra.
89. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 17, at 146-47 (1974) (emphasis added).
10
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indicated that a fixed distance (200-mile) criterion must not be the
sole means of determining jurisdictional limits, since international
law currently recognized that national sovereignty extended at least
as far as the lower outer edge of the continental margin adjoining
the abyssal plains.90 The Argentinian representative stated, "[tihe
territorial integrity of States, which was one of the basic principles
of international law, could not be altered with impunity. Her dele-
gation was not prepared to negotiate on its territorial integrity, and
its continental shelf was part of its territory."'"
Other States with wide shelves echoed this position, including
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,92 Norway,93 Mexico,94
the United Kingdom 95 and New Zealand. 96 The support was not
limited to wide-shelf states, however. The representative of El
Salvador, which has a narrow continental shelf, stated that: "there
was no reason why that natural prolongation of its territory should
end at any fixed distance, regardless of the nature of the seabed." 97
Burma's representative added "that the doctrine of the natural pro-
longation of the land territory into the sea had . . . attained the
status of a basic principle of international maritime law."98 Peru's
representative commented that "no country had stronger claims
than the coastal state over any part of its continental shelf, since the
shelf constituted a natural and indivisible part of its national terri-
tory."
99
B. The EEZ as a Jurisdictional Limitation
Those countries opposing the extension of jurisdiction over the
continental shelf beyond the 200-mile EEZ based their objections
on three separate grounds. One, the ICJ holding that the continen-
tal shelf was the natural prolongation of the nation's territory could
not be relied upon since the ICJ had not been dealing with this
issue of the outer limits of the continental shelf; two, the ICJ's inter-
pretation of the word "adjacent" would preclude any seaward juris-
90. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 18, at 150 (1974).
91. Id.
92. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 20, at 160 (1974).
93. Id at 164.
94. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 22, at 173 (1974).
95. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 25, at 200 (1974).
96. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 62/C. 2/SR. 21, at 170 (1974).
97. Id. at 149.
98. Id. at 155.
99. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 16, at 145 (1974).
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dictional extension of such magnitude; and three, extension beyond
200 miles would come largely at the expense of the common heri-
tage fund.
1. Questionable applicability of natural prolongation doctrine.
While some nations attacked the ISNT provision because it al-
lowed coastal states to maintain jurisdiction beyond the 200-mile
limit and detracted from the common heritage of mankind, others
questioned whether nations really had a valid legal interest in that
part of the margin.
The Jamaican delegate cautioned against interpreting the
North Sea Cases as sanctioning coastal state jurisdiction through-
out the natural prolongation of the continental shelf."° He pointed
out that the ICJ had been addressing the issue of delimitation of the
continental shelf between adjoining states, and not the seaward ex-
tent of its jurisdictional limits.10 In closing, he warned that any
sense of legitimacy for extended jurisdictional claims based on the
Court's natural prolongation concept might be unsound.
10 2
This restrictive interpretation of the Court's opinion is sup-
ported by a number of scholars, among them Professor Wolfgang
Friedmann who wrote: "Nowhere does the Court's Judgment sup-
port indefinite prolongation of land territory into the sea."'0 3 Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin echoed this interpretation by stating "'natural
prolongation' never gave any state proprietary rights."'" Whether
the concept of natural prolongation was meant solely as a method
for delimitation or whether it may properly be applied to seaward
jurisdictional limits is impossible to determine without further clar-
ification by the Court.
2. Limits to the adjacency concept. Another part of the
Court's opinion raises doubts as to whether the Court meant to
sanction an interpretation which allows jurisdiction to extend as
many as 200 or more miles. In the North Sea Cases the Court
stated: "[I]t is evident that by no stretch of imagination can a point
on the continental shelf situated say a hundred miles or even much
less, from a given coast, be regarded as 'adjacent' to it, or to any
100. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR. 20, at 167 (1974).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. W.G. FRIEDMANN, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS 39-42 (1972).
104. Henkin, .4 Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 71 (1970).
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coast at all, in the normal sense of adjacency."' 10 5
Although the term adjacency was applied to a set of circum-
stances unrelated to the outer limits of the shelf regions, it nonethe-
less raises some interesting questions. Professor Goldie suggests
that the term adjacency is a multidimensional term, and that
The distances which the Court mentioned might well be com-
pletely irrelevant in cases where the outer limits of the
permissable shelf region are being delimited without the re-
straining presence of adjoining, let alone opposite states; . . .
Adjacency in the North Sea context will tell us little that is di-
rectly relevant to the South East Pacific. . . Indeed, adjacency
should not be invoked independently of its context.106
The Court recognized that adjacency has many possible meanings
in stating that "terms such as 'near,' 'close to the shores,' 'off its
coast,' 'opposite,' 'in front of the coast,' 'in the vicinity of,' 'neigh-
boring the coast,' 'adjacent to,' 'contiguous,' etc. . . are capable of
considerable fluidity of meaning."107 Thus, any claim to extended
rights based solely upon the adjacency criteria of Article 1 of the
Continental Shelf Convention appears ripe for legal attack. In-
deed, this very point was made by the delegate from Switzerland
during the UNCLOS III meetings.' 0 8
3. Extendedjurisdiction at the expense of the common heritage
fund. Embodied in United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2749,1°9 the notion behind the common heritage of mankind was
that the resources of the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction
were to be used for the betterment of mankind.' The revenues
collected from this area were to go toward aiding the underdevel-
oped nations of the world. Since the common heritage of mankind
consisted only of those ocean resources beyond national jurisdic-
tion, the viability of the concept depended upon where national ju-
risdictional limits were drawn.
Countries favoring the strict 200-mile limit argued that any ju-
risdictional expansion beyond the 200-mile limit would drastically
reduce the anticipated revenues of the common heritage."' They
105. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 11, para. 41.
106. Goldie, A Lexicographical Controvery-The Word "Adjacent" in Article I ofthe Con-
tinental Shelf Convention, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 829, at 832-33 (1972).
107. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 11, para. 41.
108. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 19, at 158 (1974).
109. Declaration on Sea Bed and Ocean Floor, supra note 14.
110. Id.
11. See text accompanying notes 113-116 infra.
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claimed that by allowing states to maintain jurisdiction beyond the
200-mile limit, the common heritage fund would be rendered
meaningless." 2 Speaking at Caracas, the delegate from Gambia
stated that "if the concept of the continental shelf were to survive, it
would be largely at the expense of the common heritage of man-
kind, and no one should then be surprised if the conference were to
be dubbed a monumental hoax.""' 3 The delegate from Jamaica
pointed out that if claims were allowed to the end of the continental
margin only seven percent of the offshore resources would fall
within the common heritage, raising serious doubts as to the eco-
nomic viability of the fund.' '" The representative of Nepal, spon-
sor of the Nepal Proposal,"' felt that creating a 200-mile EEZ itself
dealt a death blow to the common heritage idea, since "the over-
whelming proportion of ocean mineral wealth. . . is found within
the EEZ.
'"" 16
While the principle of the common heritage of mankind is
given much lip service, few nations are willing to give up anything
to support it. The attitude seems to be one of support in theory
only. Some of the strongest proponents of the concept have them-
selves significantly undermined its potential funding base by en-
dorsing preconference declarations which advocate a 200-mile
EEZ.' t 7 Illustrative of this are many of the African nations who
spoke strongly in favor of the 200-mile EEZ." 8 They concluded
that limiting coastal state jurisdiction to 200 miles would preserve
the common heritage fund." 9 However, the facts do not seem to
support this rationale. Thirty-six percent of the world's ocean
120
and the overwhelming majority of its mineral wealth' 2 ' fall within
the EEZ.
It appears as if having decided upon that arbitrary mile limita-
112. Id.
113. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/SR. 20, at 160 (1974).
114. Id. at 167.
115. The Nepal Proposal would subject nations to a revenue-sharing formula on re-
sources taken from within the EEZ which would provide the funding base for the Common
Heritage Fund. See Memorandum by the Leader of the Delegation of Nepal relating to the
Establishment of a Common Heritage Fund in the Interest of Mankind as a Whole but
particularly in the Interest of the Developing Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/65 (1978).
116. Id..at 3.
117. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
118. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/SR., at 22-27 (1974).
119. Id.
120. Kronfol, The Exclusive Economic Zone.- A Critique o/Contemporary Law of the Sea,
9 J. MARITIME L. 461, 463 (1978).
121. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 7, at 71.
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tion, these nations have attempted to hold the line there. What they
have failed to do is take a hard look at just what their earlier sup-
port for the 200-mile EEZ had done to that concept.
By endorsing the 200-mile zone, the developing nations sup-
ported an idea directly adverse to their interest in the common heri-
tage fund. Any extension of national jurisdiction diminishes the
common heritage fund, and it must necessarily be at the expense of
the common heritage of mankind.
The attempt to halt seaward encroachment at 200 miles ap-
pears to be too little too late. During the Caracas debates few na-
tions indicated a willingness to give up their resources for the
common heritage of mankind. The time has come to reconsider the
concept of the common heritage fund. If the idea is no longer via-
ble, or if nations are unwilling to contribute to it from their re-
sources, this should be admitted, and the concept should be
abandoned. To verbally embrace the concept without providing
any substantive support merely distorts the issues and debates
before the conference.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND THE COSTS OF FAILURE
A. The Irish Proposal
Between 1974 and 1978 few changes in the basic positions
taken at Caracas occurred. Only minor modifications were made in
the treaty provisions concerned with the continental shelf and the
EEZ, and prospects for a consensus on this issue appeared to be
fading.
Then, in 1978, the Irish delegation submitted what it hoped
would be an acceptable compromise solution.' 22 Accepted as part
122. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Reports of the Commit-
tees and Negotiating Groups on negotiations at the Seventh Session, May 19, 1978, NG. 6/I.
Relevant portions of the Irish Proposal state:
1 The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural pro-
longation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not
extend up to that distance.
2 The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass
of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope
and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor nor the subsoil thereof.
3 For the purpose of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer
edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
by either:
(a) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 4 by reference to the
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of the draft treaty during the 1979 session,"' and modified during
the spring 1980 meeting,'24 the Irish proposal provided what many
consider to be an acceptable compromise on the jurisdictional limi-
tation issue.'
25
The new provisions provide a definition of the continental
margin' 26  and establish maximum limits for national jurisdic-
tion. 12 In addition, they provide a method for delimiting the outer
edge of the continental margin "by reference to the outermost fixed
points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least
one per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of
the continental slope."'128  While the proposal does have its good
points, it introduces too many measurement criteria and therefore
should not be accepted without further revision and clarification.
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary
rocks is at least 1% of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of
the continental slope; or,
(b) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 4 by reference to fixed
points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental
slope. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continen-
tal slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gra-
dient at its base.
4 The coastal State shall delineate the seaward boundary of its Continental Shelf
where that Shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured by straight lines not exceeding 60
nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, such points to be defined by co-
ordinates of latitude and longitude.
123. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, (ICNT) Article 76, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/Rev. 1 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 686, 723 (1979).
124. During the 1980 New York session, March 3 through April 4, the Irish Proposal was
amended. Added to Article 76(3), the definition of the continental margin, were the words
"It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof." U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 2 (1980). See note 126 infra. Other changes were made,
but they do not effect the provisions dealing with jurisdictional delimitation.
125. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference On the Law of the Sea.- The Seventh
Session (1978), 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 19, at 21-22 (1979).
126. See ICNT, supra notes 123-24, art. 76(3).
3 The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass
of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope
and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the
subsoil thereof.
127. Id. art. 76(5).
128. Id. art. 76(4)(a)(i) and (ii).
4 (a) For purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer
edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
by either:
(i) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 6 by reference to the
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at
least I per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continen-
tal slope; or,
(ii) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 6'by reference to fixed
points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope.
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The most notable accomplishment of the Irish Proposal is that
it establishes a much needed definition of the legal character of the
continental margin, a definition which had been notably absent in
the earlier texts. Because Article 76(1) allows for coastal state juris-
diction "to the outer edge of the continental margin" such a defini-
tion was necessary to avoid possible confusion based upon differing
definitions of the margin.
The major weakness of the proposal as adopted is that it fails
to provide a precise method by which to delimit the boundary lines
of the continental margin beyond the 200-mile limit.'29 Instead of
clarifying the existing delimitation problems by providing a precise
means for determining jurisdictional boundaries, the provision
merely adds to the confusion. By tying boundary lines to the thick-
ness of sedimentary rocks a° the Conference has fallen prey to the
same culprit that plagued the 1958 Convention - lack of certainty.
From a practical perspective, Professor Hedberg points out that ir-
regularities in sediment thickness' and meager sediment thickness
data 32 combine to make implementation difficult and precise de-
limitation unlikely. He concludes that ". . . perhaps the greatest
defect of the Irish. . . formula as regards practical applicability, is
its compounding of two uncertainties in arriving at a boundary line:
(i) the uncertainty of correct total sediment thickness determination
and (ii) the uncertainty of precise location of the base of the
slope." 3 3 In addition to tying boundary line to sediment thickness,
the proposal also establishes a maximum limit for seaward jurisdic-
tion of either 350 miles or 100 miles beyond the 2,500 meter
isobath.1
3 4
Thus, under the Irish Proposal changes adopted by the Confer-
ence jurisdiction may extend to either 1) the 200-mile limit, or 2)
beyond 200 miles to the outer edge of the continental margin, that
location being determined by sediment thickness or 3) to a maxi-
mum distance of 350 miles or 4) 100 miles beyond the 2,500 meter
isobath. By providing as many measurement criteria as it does, the
ICNT fails to achieve certainty in jurisdictional delimitation.
Commenting on the changes, Professor Hedberg wrote "the Law of
the Sea Conference, in its efforts to satisfy everyone, is a compli-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Hedberg, Ocean floor Boundaes, 204 Science No. 4389, at 138, April 13, 1979.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 139.
134. Supra note 127.
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cated hodgepodge and travesty to which I believe the United States
should never agree, because it is lacking in sound overall guiding
principle, impracticable in application, and unfair to many nations,
including the United States."'
13 5
While these provisions may satisfy those nations who want a
fixed 200-mile limit by giving some valuable shelf area to the com-
mon heritage of mankind, and the wide margin nations, by al-
lowing jurisdiction well beyond 200 miles, they do not resolve the
basic delimitation problem. Therefore, despite the recent state-
ments by the United States Delegation that "Committee II ... vir-
tually completed its work,"' 36 much remains to be done. Unless a
single, clear guideline for delimitation is inserted, it is only a matter
of time before jurisdictional disputes develop.
B. The Cost of Failure
The question of what happens if the Conference either fails to
produce a treaty, or if a treaty is produced but not ratified takes on
increased signficance with each passing year. Commenting on the
Conference's chances for success, United States Ambassador Elliot
Richardson admitted: "[wle have to recognize the possibility, in-
deed the probability, that we won't succeed."' 37 If Ambassador
Richardson's comments prove correct, what will be the legal status
of the continental shelf, and what jurisdictional limits will prevail?
Without a treaty there will be five areas of international law to
look to for guidance. They are:
1. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf;
2. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases Opinion;
3. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT);
4. National Legislation and Practice;
5. Customary International Law;
As discussed above, both the 1958 Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf and the North Sea Cases are inadequate as controlling
law since they are subject to numerous conflicting interpreta-
tions. 38
135. Hedberg, Evalution of U.S. Mexico Draft Treaty on Boundaries in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, 14 MARINE TECH. Soc. J. 32 (1980).
136. United States Delegation Report, Ninth Session of the Third United Nation Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, February 27-April 4, 1980, New York, at 31.
137. United States Ambasador Pesimirtic About Agreement on Seas, Washington Post,
Apr. 14, 1978, p. 19 col. 1.
138. See text accompanying notes 89-113 supra.
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As for the ICNT, obviously if it doesn't come into force it will
have no binding effect on the practice of nations. There is little
doubt that it will remain useful as a reference guide for drafting
ocean legislation or bilateral treaties. However, its value in deter-
mining the legal status of the margin would be restricted to its per-
suasiveness as a document which once gave a sense of international
opinion.
What is left then is state practice and customary international
law. Customary international law develops through a variety of
factors, 39 the most important of which has traditionally been the
practice of nations.14° In examining state practice over the past
fifteen years a pattern of an increasing number of extended juris-
dictional claims is discernible. Between 1967 and 1973, eighty-one
nations made 230 such claims.' 4 ' Furthermore, as of January 1,
1979, more than sixty nations asserted jurisdiction to 200 miles.' 42
One of the gauges for measuring the development of customary in-
ternational law is the response to such assertions. 4 3 Currently,
there appears to be no significant opposition to jurisdictional in-
creases up to 200 miles. When this lack of opposition is coupled
with the number of states that have adopted such practices, it is
clear that the 200-mile limit is defacto part of modem customary
international law."' If this thesis is accepted, what will be the sta-
tus of the margin beyond the 200-mile limit? It appears likely that
those nations with wide continental margins will continue to assert
jurisdictional rights beyond the 200-mile limit. Those nations
claiming these rights will base their claims on both the 1958 Con-
vention and the ICJ opinion in the North Sea Cases. While nations
opposing this may well emit loud cries of protest, it is unlikely that
they will yield any results. Unless some treaty is adopted, or the
ICJ clarifies it's North Sea Cases opinion, such jurisdictional asser-
tions are likely to become part of accepted international practice.
139. On the development of customary international law, see S16RENSEN, MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-43 (1968).
140. Alexander, Cameron and Nixon, The Costs of Failure at the Third Law of the Sea
Conference, 9 J. MARITIME L. 13, at 15 (1977).
141. Swing, supra note 3, at 531.
142. Lynch, supra note 45, at 34.
143. Laylin, Emerging Customary Law of the Sea, 10 INT'L LAW 67 (1976).
144. Id. at 672. It should be noted that not all of the 200 mile claims were for all rights to
the living and nonliving resources of the seabed. Some of the claims were for fishery conser-
vation zones or exclusive fishery zones, while others involved claims over the continental
shelf. Therefore, it is not clear whether the customary 200-mile zone would include all the
rights of the exclusive economic zone.
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CONCLUSION
When UNCLOS III began meeting seven years ago one of the
major problems facing the Conference was the establishment of
limits to national jurisdiction over the continental margin. With
nearly one third of the world's petroleum resources located beneath
it,' 4 5 control of the margin remains an important issue. Although it
has been addressed by the Conference, to date this problem has not
been adequately resolved.
After agreeing on a 200-mile EEZ during the first substantive
meetings in 1974,'" the Conferees have been unable to develop
clear delimitation criteria for those areas of the margin which ex-
tend beyond 200 miles. Instead, they have adopted the provisions
known as the Irish Proposal, 47 provisions which in the final analy-
sis do little to clarify the issue. What the Irish Proposal does is
establish three different limits to national jurisdiction. Aside from
the 200-mile limit provided for in Article 57, the Irish Proposal lim-
its jurisdiction to either 350 miles,141 100 miles beyond the 2,500
meter isobath, 49 or the "outer edge of the continental margin.
''
15
Thus, the Conferees at UNCLOS III have succeeded in replacing
the nebulous delimitation criteria developed under both the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1969 North Sea Cases
with a different set of vague and impractical criteria. While these
provisions have provided some clarity, as with the definition of the
continental margin,' 5' they still fail to provide the needed certainty
in delimitation. What was needed seven years ago and what is
needed today is a single precise method of delimitation rooted in
data subject to practical implementation.
With the lion's share of the valuable ocean floor already sub-
ject to national control, it is foolish to risk possible conflicts and
confrontations when clarity could avoid them. With or without a
treaty it appears as if a 200-mile EEZ will remain with us as part of
customary international law. The only issue is how far beyond 200
miles national seabed jurisdiction will extend. If the Irish Proposal
145, Supra note 4.
146. Supra note 78.
147. Supra note 121.
148. Supra note 127.
149. Id.
150. Supra notes 121 & 128.
151. Supra note 126.
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